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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
implied in the case of misappropriation of funds belonging to an
ordinary partnership. It is unlikely, however, that such a dis-
tinction was intended by the draftsmen of the Code or the Legis-
lature which enacted it. It is submitted that full effect should
be given to the theory that a partnership is a legal entity and to
Article 2 of the Criminal Code, thus satisfying the requirement
that the taking of property belonging "to another" and thereby
imposing criminal liability upon a defrauding partner. In any
event, it is hoped that subsequent cases will limit the present
holding to cases involving commercial partnerships.
William H. Cook, Jr.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE- PROCEEDINGS OF GRAND JURY -
PRESENCE OF UNAUTHORIZED PERSON
Defendant filed a motion to quash based on the contention
that the presence of a policeman attached to the district attor-
ney's office as an investigator, who "monitored" a "Sound-
scriber" machine used to record testimony of witnesses before
the grand jury, was a violation of the defendant's right of
secrecy during grand jury proceedings. The state contended that
the investigator was present in the capacity of a stenographer,
as contemplated by Article 215 of the Louisiana Code of Criminal
Procedure.' The district court granted defendant's motion. On
appeal, held, affirmed. Article 215 is mandatory in requiring
that grand jury sessions be kept secret. The accused's rights
were substantially violated by the presence of a recording ma-
chine operator who was not one of the persons specifically enu-
merated and authorized to be present at grand jury hearings.
State v. Revere, 232 La. 184, 94 So.2d 25 (1957).
The function of the grand jury is to protect both society and
the individual.2 As an accusatory body, its members decide from
the evidence adduced whether there is sufficient cause for re-
quiring the accused to stand trial and answer the charge made
1. LA. I.S. 15:215 (1950) states: "The sessions of the grand jury shall be
secret, but the district attorney, as their legal adviser, shall have free access to
said sessions; the district attorney may cause the testimony taken before the
grand jury to be reported by a stenographer, who must be first sworn by the fore-
man of the grand jury; and whenever a witness is unable to speak the English
language, the grand jury shall have the right, at its discretion, to employ an inter-
preter to translate the testimony of the witness, but such interpreter shall be first
sworn to keep secret the proceedings of the grand jury."
2. People v. Minet, 296 N.Y. 315, 322, 73 N.E.2d 529, 532 (1947).
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against him.8 To insure the proper functioning of this body, its
sessions are conducted in secrecy, to the exclusion of all persons
not specifically authorized to be present.4 This secrecy require-
ment is primarily for the benefit of the state :5 it secures for com-
plainants and witnesses freedom from any apprehension that
their testimony will be revealed; it secures for the jurors free-
dom from apprehension that their opinions or votes may be
publicly disclosed; and it prevents the indicted person from being
provided with clues enabling him to avoid arrest and punish-
ment.6 On the other hand, it also protects the accused person
from public disclosure of groundless charges made against him.7
The prevailing American rule, based on the concept that the
secrecy requirement is primarily for the benefit of the state, is
that, unless the accused is prejudiced by the presence of an un-
authorized person during the grand jury proceedings, the irregu-
larity is insufficient grounds for setting aside the indictment.8
However, a substantial minority of American states adhere to
the rule that, regardless of whether there is a showing of prej-
udice, indictments will be set aside when unauthorized persons
have been present during grand jury sessions.9 The minority
view finds strong support in those jurisdictions where, as in
Louisiana, there is a statutory enumeration of those who may
be present at the grand jury proceedings."
3. See 4 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *300; 1 CHITTY, THE CRIMINAL LAW
215 (1819) ; 2 HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 157 (1736) ; 2 HAWKINS, PLEAS OF
THE CROWN 367 (1787) ; 1 HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 321 et seq.
(7th ed. 1956).
4. See State v. Watson, 34 La. Ann. 669 (1882) ; 1 CrITTy, THE CRIMINAL
LAW 214 (1819); 1 HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 322 (7th ed.
1956) ; 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE 716 et seq. (3d ed. 1940).
5. See State v. Brewster, 70 Vt. 341, 40 Atl. 1037, 42 L.R.A. 444 (1898),
and cases cited therein. See also 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE 716 et seq. (3d ed. 1940).
6. 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE 716 et seq. (3d ed. 1940).
7. Ibid.
8. See Jones v. State, 150 Ala. 54, 43 So. 179 (1907) ; People v. Munson, 319
Ill. 596, 150 N.E. 280 (1925) ; State v. Bates, 148 Ind. 610, 48 N.E. 2 (1897) ;
State v. Ernster, 147 Minn. 81, 179 N.W. 640 (1920) ; Le Barron v. State, 107
Miss. 663, 65 So. 648 (1914) ; State v. McFeeley, 136 N.J.L. 102, 54 A.2d 797
(1947); State v. Crowder, 193 N.C. 130, 136 S.E. 337 (1927) ; Commonwealth
v. Kirk, 340 Pa. 346, 17 A.2d 195 (1941) ; State v. Brewster, 70 Vt. 341, 40 Atl.
1037 (1898) ; Draper v. Commonwealth, 132 Va. 648, 111 S.E. 471 (1922)
Annot., 4 A.L.R.2d 392, 395 (1949), and cases cited therein.
9. See Commonwealth v. Harris, 231 Mass. 584, 121 N.E. 409 (1919) ; Hart-
graves v. State, 5 Okla. Crim. 266, 114 Pac. 343 (1911); Meyers v. Second
Judicial District Court, 108 Utah 32, 156 P.2d 711 (1945); Annot., 4 A.L.R.2d
396 (1949), and cases cited therein.
10. While such a result may be rationalized on the rule of strict statutory
construction, actually the result is probably based on the broader policy of pro-
tecting the accused's substantive rights during the grand jury proceedings. See 2
SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 363 et seq. (1904). This
view would appear to be borne out by the fact that most of those states following
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Article 215 of the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure
provides that the prosecuting attorney, an interpreter, and a
stenographer may be present at the sessions of the grand jury.1
This article is similar to corresponding provisions of the Ameri-
can Law Institute Code of Criminal Procedure12 and the Fed-
eral Rules.' 8 Prior to the 1928 Code of Criminal Procedure Lou-
isiana jurisprudence had not been uniform. Early jurisprudence
had followed the strict view that the presence of any unauthor-
ized person during the proceedings of the grand jury would be
sufficient grounds for quashing an indictment. 4 However, later
Supreme Court decisions had shown a decidedly liberal trend.15
In State v. Firmatura0 the presence of a deputy sheriff who
acted as an interpreter was held to be an insufficient ground
for quashing an indictment, because the interpreter was an
"ordinary and necessary instrumentality for the discharge of
[the grand jury's] duty."'1 7 In State v. Louviere, s the court
refused to quash an indictment, stating that the presence of a
stenographer "was no more prejudicial to the accused than if
that same testimony had been recorded on a phonograph or other
mechanical device."' 0 The holdings of these two cases were codi-
fied in the enumeration of authorized persons in Article 215.
The court applied this provision in State v. Howard,20 sustain-
the majority view (see cases note 8 supra) either have no statutory provisions
enumerating those permitted to be present during grand jury sessions or else their
statutes are broadly drawn.
11. See note 1 supra.
12. "Section 133. Who may be present during session of grand jury: No person
shall be present at the sessions of the grand jury except the witness under ex-
amination, the prosecuting attorney, the stenographer, if any, and the interpreter,
if any. No person shall be present while the grand jurors are deliberating or
voting. Any person violating either of the above prohibitions may be held in con-
tempt of court."
13. FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(d) : "Who May Be Present. Attorneys for the govern-
ment, the witness under examination, interpreters when needed and for the purpose
of taking the evidence, a stenographer may be present while the grand jury is in
session, but no person other than the jurors may be present while the grand jury
is deliberating or voting." Rule 6(d) became effective March 31, 1946, and gen-
erally continues existing law. See Act of May 18, 1933, c. 31, 48 STAT. 58 (1933).
14. State v. Watson, 34 La. Ann. 669 (1882), where the presence of a clerk
appointed by the judge was sufficient grounds for quashing the indictment.
15. In State v. White, 37 La. Ann. 172 (1885), the fact that an outsider was
present during the grand jury session was not sufficient to quash the indictment.
To the same effect, see State v. Stewart, 45 La. Ann. 1164, 14 So. 143 (1893)
State v. Harris, 39 La. Ann. 228, 1 So. 446 (1887).
16. 121 La. 676, 46 So. 691 (1908). The opinion shows that the deputy
sheriff was sworn by the foreman of the grand jury as an interpreter and indi-
cates that at no time during the grand jury session was he present in his capacity
as a deputy sheriff.
17. Id. at 681, 46 So. at 693.
18. 165 La. 718, 115 So. 914 (1928).
19. Id. at 720, 11.5 So. at 914.
20. 230 La. 327, 88 So.2d 387 (1956).
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ing the use of a recording machine during grand jury proceed-
ings. It held, without indicating who operated the machine, that
under Article 215 no unauthorized person was in the grand jury
room. However, it was later pointed out that the person op-
erating the recording machine in that instance was the district
attorney. 2
1
In the instant case, the situation differed from that of the
Howard case in that the individual operating the recording ma-
chine was not one of those specifically enumerated in Article
215. The court's choice of a technical rather than a liberal inter-
pretation of the provision may be explained by the fact that
under Louisiana statutory provisions relating to the secrecy of
grand jury proceedings, the defendant is unable to contradict
statements of unauthorized individuals present at grand jury
sessions.22  Since grand jurors are incompetent to impeach any
indictment found by the body of which they are members, the
defendant cannot use their testimony to show that he has been
prejudiced by the presence of the unauthorized person at their
sessions. In this situation, the defendant's only real protection
is his right to have the jury properly impaneled and its proceed-
ings conducted in strict adherence to the law.23 Thus, the court
found that Article 215 makes it mandatory that grand jury ses-
sions be kept secret, and that this be done by limiting the per-
sons authorized to appear before that body to those specifically
enumerated in Article 215.
Seemingly, under the rule of the instant case, the presence
of any person not a qualified stenographer to operate the ma-
chine would have been sufficient ground for quashing the in-
21. However, the court stated in State v. Revere, 232 La. 184, 190, a. 4, 94
So.2d 25, 28, n. 4 (1957) : "In the recent case of State v. Howard, 230 La. 327,
88 So.2d 387, there was no unauthorized person in the grand jury room, it being
conceded the recording machine there used was operated by the district attorney."
22. The two main statutes involved are LA. R.S. 15:470 and 15:471 (1950).
R.S. 15:470 reads: "No juror, grand or petit, is competent to testify to his own
or his fellows' misconduct, or to give evidence to explain, qualify or impeach any
indictment or any verdict found by the body of which he is or was a member; but
every juror, grand or petit, is a competent witness to rebut any attack upon the
regularity of the conduct or of the findings of the body of which he is or was a
member." And R.S. 15:471 reads: "No grand juror or district attorney is com-
petent to testify as to anything that took place before the grand jury during its
sessions, or to testify upon what evidence any indictment was found, or that it
was found upon insufficient evidence, or without evidence; but the grand jurors
and the district attorney are competent witnesses both for the state and for the
defense in any prosecution for perjury or false swearing, alleged to have been
committed before the grand jury." But see State v. Kifer, 186 La. 674, 173 So.
169, 110 A.L.R. 1017 (1937).
23. State v. Revere, 232 La. 184, 199, 94 So.2d 25, 31 (1957).
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dictment. 24 However, the court appears to have been strongly
influenced by the fact that the "monitor" in this instance was
an investigator. While the court does not clearly indicate what
the result would have been if the investigator had also been a
stenographer, the general tenor of the opinion indicates that the
indictment would have been quashed in such a case. It appears,
however, that in order to promote the efficiency of grand jury
proceedings, a legislative change would be desirable, extending
the enumeration of Article 215 to include an individual to op-
erate a recording machine during sessions of the grand jury.
Such an amendment should clearly exclude members of the police
force and district attorneys' investigatory staff from the grand
jury sessions, except when present in their capacity as witnesses.
Patsy Jo McDowell
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE - REMARKS OF PROSECUTING ATTORNEY -
REFERENCE ON RETRIAL TO CONVICTION OF ACCUSED AT
FIRST TRIAL
Defendant's conviction on a charge of manslaughter was set
aside by the Supreme Court on a point of evidence. In his open-
ing statement on retrial, the district attorney referred to the
prior conviction of the defendant by the previous petit jury. The
trial judge refused to grant defendant's request to instruct the
jury to disregard the statement. On appeal, held, affirmed. The
defendant did not show, and the court could think of no way
in which the passing reference in good faith by the district at-
torney to the prior conviction was prejudicial to the cause of
the accused. Moreover, the indictment had been presented to
the jury with an endorsement thereon that the defendant had
been found guilty as charged. State v. Clark, 231 La. 807, 93
So.2d 13 (1957).
Some improper remarks by prosecuting attorneys may be
"cured" by the trial judge's instructions to the jury to disregard
them, while others are held to be "incurable," or reversible error
24. The court stated: "Our statute (RS 15:215) not only makes it mandatory
that the sessions of the grand jury be secret, but specifically enumerates the only
persons authorized to appear before that body. A 'monitor' or 'operator' of a
recording machine is not one of those enumerated, and we must conclude that until
provision is made in our law for the presence of such persons, it is not the province
of the court to hold they are included." State v. Revere, 232 La. 184, 199, 94
So.2d 25, 31 (1957).
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